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This article discusses legislative and judicial developments relating to
the Texas law of intestacy, wills, estate administration, trusts, and other
estate planning matters during the Survey period of November 1, 2014
through October 31, 2015. The reader is warned that not all newly
enacted statutes and decided cases during the Survey period are
presented, and not all aspects of each cited statute and case are analyzed.
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You must read and study the full text of each statute and case before
relying on it or using it as precedent. The discussion of most cases
includes a moral, that is, the important lesson to be learned from the case.
By recognizing situations that have resulted in time consuming and costly
litigation in the past, the reader may be able to reduce the likelihood of
the same situations arising with his or her clients.
I. INTERFACE BETWEEN PROBATE CODE AND
ESTATES CODE
The 2015 Texas Legislature made it clear that the Estates Code is to be
treated as an amendment, albeit a huge one, to the Probate Code.1 Ac-
cordingly, if a will refers to “the Probate Code as amended,” that refer-
ence is deemed to be the Estates Code.
II. INTESTACY
A. POSTHUMOUS HEIRS
Posthumous heirs must now be in gestation at the time of the intes-
tate’s death to obtain inheritance rights.2 This amendment precludes the
use of the decedent’s sperm, eggs, or embryos to produce heirs who are
born years or decades after the intestate’s death. In addition, there are no
longer different rules for lineal and collateral posthumous heirs.
B. DETERMINATION OF HEIRSHIP
The contents of the application to declare heirship was changed. Some
of the significant changes are noted below:
• The time of death is no longer required; the date of the intestate’s
death is sufficient.3
• Instead of providing the residences of the intestate’s heirs, the ap-
plication must now state the physical addresses of the heirs where
service can be had.4
The application must indicate whether each heir is an adult or a minor.5
Service of citation is not needed on a party who entered an appearance
or who has waived citation.6
III. WILLS
A. TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY
Regardless of how competent a person is at the time of will execution,
family members who are dissatisfied with the terms of the will are likely
1. See, e.g., TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 21.002 (West 2016).
2. Id. § 201.056.
3. Id. § 202.005.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. § 202.055.
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to contest the will, especially if the estate has substantial value. For exam-
ple, in In re Estate of Hemsley,7 after the probate court determined that
the testator had testamentary capacity, the will contestants appealed. The
El Paso Court of Appeals affirmed.8 The court of appeals studied the
evidence, which included testimony of the attorney who drafted the testa-
tor’s power of attorney.9 The attorney declined to draft the testator’s will,
fearing a contest due to the testator’s celebrity status garnered through
roles such as the character of George Jefferson from the classic television
programs All in the Family and The Jeffersons.10 The court of appeals also
heard evidence from the attorney who eventually prepared the will.11
This attorney had no doubt that the testator had full testamentary capac-
ity.12 Two other witnesses and a registered nurse caring for the testator
testified in a similar manner.13 Nonetheless, the contestants claimed that
this evidence was legally insufficient.14
B. SAVINGS STATUTE
Texas now has a savings statute, which provides that a will is valid in
Texas, even if it does not meet the Texas requirements, if it meets the
requirements of the jurisdiction where (1) the will was executed; (2) the
decedent was domiciled; or (3) the decedent had a place of residence.15
C. ONE-STEP SELF-PROVING AFFIDAVIT
Revisions to the sequencing of events for the proper use of a self-prov-
ing affidavit, which is included in the will itself, eliminated the extremely
awkward procedure that was previously required.16
D. LIMITATION ON COURT’S AUTHORITY TO RESTRICT WILLS
A court may no longer prohibit a person from revoking an existing will
or codicil.17 Previously, the court was restricted only from preventing a
person from executing a new will or codicil.
7. 460 S.W.3d 629 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, pet. denied).
8. Id. at 637.
9. Id. at 635.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 635–36.
12. Id. at 636.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 251.053 (West 2016).
16. See id. § 251.1045(a). For a detailed discussion of the will execution ceremony
under the amended statute, see Gerry W. Beyer, How to Conduct a Modern Texas Will
Execution, EST. PLAN. DEV. TEX. PROF., at 1 (Oct. 20, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2087884 [http://perma.cc/9RN4-PR34].
17. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 253.001(b)–(c).
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E. ELECTION WILLS
In re Estate of Cole18 serves as a reminder of the importance of a mar-
ried testator including an election provision in a will that expressly states
whether the will is, or is not, intended to trigger an election by the surviv-
ing spouse. A dispute arose as to whether a husband’s will required his
wife to make an election to either (1) assert rights to her one-half of the
community estate; or (2) give up these rights in exchange for her gifts
under the will.19 The trial court determined, as a matter of law, that the
will put the wife to an election, and the wife appealed.20
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals reversed.21 The court of appeals fo-
cused on the clause of the husband’s will that provided that he intended
only to dispose of his property, “including [his] one-half interest in the
community property.”22 His wife claimed that this clause meant that a gift
in the will leaving an investment account to a son would only include
funds that were the husband’s separate property or his one-half of the
community property.23 The court of appeals conducted a careful review
of Texas election will cases and concluded that the husband’s will “did not
clearly and unequivocally” put his wife to an election.24 The husband’s
mere statement in the will that the investment account was his separate
property “does not mitigate his prior clear and specific language that he
intended only to dispose of his separate property and his one-half of the
community property.”25 At most, this created an ambiguity that pre-
cluded a holding that the will put the wife to an election.
F. NO CONTEST CLAUSE
Both a recent case and legislative change make it clear that no contest
clauses are not effective to protect executors and other fiduciaries from
claims of breach of fiduciary duty. They, however, are enforceable if a
beneficiary attempts to change the testator’s dispositive plan.
The statutory provision provides that forfeiture clauses are unenforce-
able if there is an existing law which provides that these clauses may not
be construed to prevent a beneficiary from enforcing fiduciary duties or
seeking a judicial construction of the will.26
In Ard v. Hudson,27 the testatrix’s will contained the following in ter-
rorem provision:
18. No. 02-13-00417-CV, 2015 WL 392230 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 29, 2015, no
pet.) (mem. op.).
19. Id. at *2.
20. Id. at *2–3.
21. Id. at *6.
22. Id. at *5.
23. Id. at *4.
24. Id. at *4–6.
25. Id. at *5.
26. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 254.005(b) (West 2016).
27. No. 02-13-00198-CV, 2015 WL 4967045 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 20, 2015,
pet. filed).
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If any beneficiary hereunder shall contest the probate or validity of
this Will or any provision thereof, or shall institute or join in (except
as a party defendant) any proceeding to contest the validity of this
Will or to prevent any provision thereof from being carried out in
accordance with its terms (regardless of whether or not such pro-
ceedings are instituted in good faith and with probable cause), then
all benefits provided for such beneficiary are revoked and such bene-
fits shall pass to the non-contesting residuary beneficiaries of this
Will in the proportion that the share of each such non-contesting re-
siduary beneficiary bears to the aggregate of the effective (non-con-
testing) shares of the residuary . . . . Each benefit conferred herein is
made on the condition precedent that the beneficiary shall accept
and agree to all provisions of this Will.28
One of the beneficiaries, Mary, brought suit against the executors and
trustees for breach of duty, sought temporary and permanent injunctive
relief, and requested the appointment of a receiver.29 The fiduciaries
claimed these actions triggered forfeiture of her benefits under the will.30
The trial court agreed and Mary appealed.31
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals reversed.32 The court of appeals held
that “a beneficiary has an inherent right to challenge the actions of a
fiduciary and does not trigger a forfeiture clause by doing so.”33 The
court of appeals continued by explaining that this right would be worth-
less if the beneficiary could not seek remedies.34 Accordingly, the court
of appeals also held that “a beneficiary exercising his or her inherent
right to challenge a fiduciary may seek injunctive and other relief, includ-
ing the appointment of a receiver, from the trial court to protect what the
testator or grantor intended the beneficiary to have without triggering the
forfeiture clause.”35
The court of appeals then turned its attention to the last line of the in
terrorem clause, which imposes a condition precedent on being a benefici-
ary, that is, to “accept and agree” to the will provisions.36 Consistent with
its holding on the forfeiture part of the clause, the court of appeals stated
that Mary’s actions did not violate the condition precedent.37 Mary’s
challenges were to the conduct of the fiduciaries, not the terms of the
will.38
A beneficiary’s action must first fall within the scope of a no contest
clause before the beneficiary’s good faith and just cause in bringing that
28. Id. at *2.
29. Id. at *3–4.
30. Id. at *4.
31. Id. at *5–6.
32. Id. at *9.




37. Id. at *9.
38. Id.
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action is relevant as a defense to forfeiture.39 For example, in Estate of
Cole,40 a husband’s will contained a no contest clause which, among other
things, provided that if his wife contested the “characterization of [his]
property as [his] separate property” she would forfeit all gifts to her
under the will.41 His wife made a claim for her community property inter-
est against an investment account her husband classified as his separate
property.42 The trial court determined that her claim did not trigger the
no contest clause but submitted the issue of her good faith and just cause
to the jury, which subsequently decided she was lacking.43 The wife
appealed.44
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals first agreed with the trial court that
the wife was not contesting the will or any of its provisions.45 Instead, she
was merely asserting a right to her own property, which the will did not
prevent her from doing, because her husband stated that he was only dis-
posing his separate property and his one-half of the community prop-
erty.46 Although puzzled about why the trial court submitted the issue of
the wife’s good faith and probable cause to the jury, such action did not
impact the judgment and, thus, was harmless error.47
G. DIVORCE AND POUR OVER TRUSTS
The provisions of an irrevocable pour over trust in favor of an ex-
spouse or a relative of an ex-spouse, who is not also a relative of the
testator, will now be ineffective unless a court order or contract provides
otherwise. Instead, the trust will be read as if that person disclaimed his
or her interest or, in the case of fiduciary appointments, died before the
divorce.48
H. EXONERATION
When the Probate Code was recodified, the 2009 Texas legislature in-
advertently dropped the date on or after which the testator had to exe-
cute a will for the no-exoneration presumption to apply. This date,
September 1, 2005, was restored.49
39. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 254.005 (West 2015).
40. No. 02-13-00417-CV, 2015 WL 392230 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 29, 2015, no
pet.) (mem. op.).
41. Id. at *1.
42. Id.
43. Id. at *2.
44. Id. at *3.
45. Id. at *9.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 123.001(2)(b)(2) (West 2016).
49. Id. § 255.304.
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I. CLASS GIFTS
Unless the testator’s will provides otherwise, a person must be born or
in gestation at the time of the testator’s death to qualify as a member of a
class for purposes of a class gift.50 This section, designed to preclude the
use of the decedent’s sperm, eggs, or embryos to produce class members
who are born years or decades after the testator’s death, may have an
inadvertent impact because the section does not distinguish between im-
mediate gifts (e.g., “to my grandchildren”) and postponed gifts (e.g., “to
my child for life, and then to my grandchildren”). In the latter case, it is
likely the testator intended to include in the class grandchildren born af-
ter the testator’s death.
J. JUDICIAL MODIFICATION AND REFORMATION
In a major change in Texas law, courts have now been given the author-
ity to modify and reform a will even if the will is unambiguous,51 effec-
tively overruling the Texas Supreme Court case, San Antonio Area
Foundation v. Lang,52 which held that “extrinsic evidence is not admissi-
ble to construe an unambiguous will provision.”53
Below are the key features of how a court may exercise this new
power:
• Only a personal representative may petition for modification or
reformation;54 disgruntled beneficiaries and wishful beneficiaries
lack standing.
• The court has broad authority to order the personal representa-
tive to perform acts, which the testator prohibited, and to prevent
the personal representative from acting as the testator
specified.55
• The court must have a “good” reason for ordering the modifica-
tion or reformation, such as to make estate administration more
efficient, to carry out the settlor’s tax objectives, to assist a bene-
ficiary in qualifying for government benefits, or to correct a scriv-
ener’s error but only if there is clear and convincing evidence of
the testator’s intent.56
• The court must modify or reform the will to conform to the
“probable” intent of the testator.57
• The personal representative has no duty to seek a reformation or
modification and is not required to tell the beneficiaries that the
personal representative has the ability to seek reformation or
50. See id. §§ 255.401, 255.451.
51. Id. §§ 255.451–.455.
52. 35 S.W.3d 636 (Tex. 2000).
53. Id. at 637.
54. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 255.451(a).
55. Id.
56. Id. § 255.451(a)–(b).
57. Id. § 255.452.
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modification.58
• The personal representative has no liability for failing to seek ref-
ormation or modification.59
Although these provisions have the laudable goal of carrying out the
testator’s intent, they have the possibility of preventing a testator from
achieving certainty when drafting a will. For example, the testator could
write, “I leave $10,000 to X,” and later have the court decide that the
testator actually meant to leave X $100,000 or that the funds were in-
tended for Y. This is especially the case because the executor is often a
beneficiary who would benefit from an increase in gifts to itself and a
reduction in gifts to others.
K. CRIMINAL LAW INTERFACE
McCay v. State60 explains that a person involved in “evil” conduct with
respect to a will may also face criminal law liability in addition to having
the court determine that the purported will is invalid.61 The Dallas Court
of Appeals held that a person commits the criminal offense of theft if the
person, with intent to steal, causes a will to be executed in his or her favor
and then files that will for probate.62
IV. ESTATE ADMINISTRATION
A. APPLICATION TO PROBATE A WILL
An independent administrator designated by all of the decedent’s dis-
tributees now has standing to file an application to probate the decedent’s
will and for the appointment of a personal representative.63
The applicant no longer needs to state the time of the testator’s death;
stating the date of death is sufficient.64 With regard to a lost will, the
applicant no longer needs to state the age and marital status of each of
the beneficiaries and heirs. Instead, the applicant must now state whether
the person is an adult or a minor.65
If a will is being probated as a muniment of title, the applicant no
longer needs to state the time of the testator’s death; stating the date of
death is sufficient. The applicant, however, must now provide the physical
address where service can be had on the executor named in the will.66
58. Id. § 255.455(a).
59. Id. § 255.455(b).
60. 476 S.W.3d 640 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 9, 2015), cert. filed, McCay v. Texas, No.
15-9889 (June 24, 2016).
61. Id. at 642–43.
62. Id. at 645–66.
63. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN. §§ 256.051(a), 301.051 (West 2016).
64. See id. § 256.052(a).
65. See id. §§ 256.054, 257.053(3).
66. Id. § 257.051.
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B. TIMING FOR ISSUANCE OF LETTERS
An application for letters may now be filed even after four years from
the decedent’s death has elapsed if necessary to “prevent real property in
a decedent’s estate from becoming a danger to the health, safety, or wel-
fare of the general public,” provided that the applicant is a home-rule
municipality that is a creditor of the estate.67
C. FOREIGN WILLS
The 2015 Texas Legislature clarified the method of proving a foreign
will and the effectiveness of a self-proving affidavit to make the probate
process easier and more efficient.68 In addition, it is now clear that a for-
eign will that has already been probated in another state or country may
be admitted to probate in Texas, even if the application is filed more than
four years after the testator’s death.69
D. APPLICATION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION
The applicant for letters of administration no longer needs to state the
time of the intestate’s death; stating the date of death is sufficient.70 The
applicant no longer needs to state the age and marital status of each of
the heirs. Instead, the applicant must now state whether each heir is an
adult or a minor.71
E. NOTICE TO BENEFICIARIES
The affidavit or certificate of the personal representative confirming
notice to the beneficiaries no longer needs to contain the addresses of the
beneficiaries.72
F. AFFIDAVIT IN LIEU OF INVENTORY
A personal representative who elects to use the affidavit in lieu of in-
ventory procedure does not need to provide the inventory to benefi-
ciaries who are entitled to $2,000 or less, have already received the
property to which they are entitled, or have executed a written waiver.73
G. EXEMPT PROPERTY
The amounts of personal property that are exempt from creditors were
increased. For a single adult, the amount was increased from $30,000 to
$50,000 and for a family, from $60,000 to $100,000.74 If any exempt prop-
67. See id. § 301.002(b).
68. Id. § 256.152(b)–(c).
69. Id. § 501.001.
70. See id. § 301.052(3).
71. Id. § 301.052(6).
72. Id. § 308.004(a).
73. Id. § 309.056(b-1).
74. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.001(a) (West 2016).
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erty remains in an insolvent estate that was not set aside for the surviving
spouse and children, it is now clear that the balance of this exempt prop-
erty passes in the same manner as other estate property.75
H. INDEPENDENT ADMINISTRATION
It is now clear that the beneficiaries or heirs may agree to independent
administration in separate documents; they do not need to sign the same
application.76
I. CREDITORS
1. Duty of Creditor to Possess or Sell
If a creditor in a dependent administration elects or defaults to pre-
ferred debt and lien status, and decides to take possession or sell the col-
lateral prior to the maturity of the debt, the creditor must do so within a
reasonable time.77 If the creditor does not, the court may order the prop-
erty sold free of the debt and the proceeds used to pay the debt.78 This
will assist the estate in obtaining any surplus value the collateral may
have over the debt owed as well as removing the property from the estate
to reduce management expenses.79
2. Child Support Acceleration
When computing the amount of accelerated child support for which a
deceased parent is responsible, the present value of dental health insur-
ance premiums must now be included as well as health insurance
premiums.80
J. SMALL ESTATE AFFIDAVIT
The listing of estate assets in a small estate affidavit must now “indicate
which assets the applicant claims are exempt.”81
K. BILL OF REVIEW
In Valdez v. Hollenbeck,82 the intestate’s heirs sought to reopen an es-
tate administration by using a bill of review ten years after it was closed
and more than three years after learning that a probate court clerk had
stolen over $500,000 from the estate.83 The probate court denied a statu-
tory bill of review because more than two years had passed since the date
of closing, but granted the heirs’ request for an equitable bill of review by
75. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 353.153.
76. Id. §§ 401.002, 401.003(a).
77. Id. § 355.1551.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.015(c)(2) (West 2016).
81. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 205.002(b).
82. 465 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2015).
83. Id. at 220.
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applying the longer four-year period and the discovery rule.84 The heirs
then litigated their claims and prevailed against the administrator and
surety both at the trial and appellate levels.85
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the holding that the time period to
bring a bill of review had elapsed.86 The heirs’ ability to bring a bill of
review was governed by the Probate Code’s (now Estates Code § 55.251)
two-year period.87 In effect, the Code’s time period abrogated the equita-
ble bill of review in a probate context.88 Accordingly, the heir’s action
was untimely regardless of whether limitations was tolled until they dis-
covered the actions of the evil probate clerk.89 Note that although the
supreme court did not approve of tolling based on the discovery rule, it
left open the issue of whether tolling should be allowed when violations
of fiduciary duties and fraudulent concealment are at issue.90
This case teaches that in the probate context, bills of review are statuto-
rily based, not based on equity. Thus, the statutory two-year period ap-
plies. The supreme court indicated its unwillingness to approve a
discovery rule generally but left open the possibility that a discovery rule
might be acceptable if the claim is based on a breach of fiduciary duty
coupled with fraudulent concealment of that breach.
L. APPELLATE JURISDICTION
In re Estate of Romo91 reinforces the rule that if multiple wills are filed
for probate, the court must decide on the validity of each will before an
appellate court will have jurisdiction to hear an appeal.92 After an appli-
cation to probate the testator’s 2001 will was filed, an application to pro-
bate testator’s 2006 will was filed and granted. The proponent of the 2001
will then contested the 2006 will on grounds that the testator lacked testa-
mentary capacity or that the testator signed the will under undue influ-
ence. The probate court concluded that the 2006 will did not even
comport with the statutory requirements for a valid will and set aside its
order admitting the 2006 will to probate.93 The probate court did not rule
on the validity of the 2001 will.94 The proponent of the 2006 will
appealed.95
The El Paso Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, finding that it
lacked jurisdiction, because the order setting aside the probate of the
84. Id. at 224.
85. Id. at 224–25.
86. Id. at 232.
87. Id. at 226–28.
88. Id. at 227–28.
89. Id. at 231.
90. Id.
91. 469 S.W.3d 260 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.).
92. Id. at 262–63.
93. Id. at 261.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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2006 will was not a final order.96 The court of appeals explained that Es-
tates Code § 256.101 prescribes the procedure when two applications are
simultaneously pending—that is, the court must determine which will (if
either) to admit to probate.97 Because the probate court had not yet ruled
on the validity of the 2001 will, the order was not final.98
M. REMOVAL OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
In re Estate of Montemayor99 demonstrates that a trial court’s order
removing an independent executor from office will be difficult to over-
turn on appeal.100 The trial court removed the independent executor.101
The trial court based its decision on evidence that he was living in the
house, which was the main estate asset; was not making good faith efforts
to sell the house; was not making necessary repairs; and was preventing
the other beneficiaries from accessing the house.102 The executor also
stated that he would live in the house until the day he died. The order
stated that he was guilty of gross mismanagement and was incapable of
performing his fiduciary duties due to a material conflict of interest and
thus Estates Code § 404.0035(b)(3), (5) authorized his removal.103 The
independent executor appealed.104
The San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed.105 The court of appeals
explained that it reviewed the trial court’s decision under an abuse of
discretion standard and it could not find evidence of such abuse.106 The
court of appeals also rejected the independent executor’s claim that re-
moval was improper because the pleadings did not specifically use the
terms “gross misconduct” and “gross mismanagement,” because the
pleadings gave fair notice by alleging breaches of fiduciary duty and self-
dealing.107
N. LOST WILLS
In In re Estate of Standefer,108 the trial court admitted the testator’s will
to probate although the proponent of the will was unable to produce the
original and was only able to locate a photocopy. The Eastland Court of
Appeals affirmed.109
96. Id. at 262–63.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 263.
99. No. 04-14-00391-CV, 2015 WL 1875978 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 22, 2015,
no pet.) (mem. op.).
100. Id. at *5.
101. Id. at *2.
102. Id. at *1–2.
103. Id. at *2 & n.2; see TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 404.0035(b)(3), (5) (West 2015).
104. In re Estate of Montemayor, 2015 WL 1875978, at *2.
105. Id. at *5.
106. Id. at *2, *4.
107. Id. at *3.
108. No. 11-14-00221-CV, 2015 WL 5191443 (Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 21, 2015, no
pet.).
109. Id. at *7.
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The court of appeals began by examining the evidence presented at
trial.110 The alleged will left the testator’s entire estate to his two sons to
the exclusion of his daughter who then claimed that the testator died in-
testate so she could inherit one-third of the estate.111 The proponent testi-
fied that the testator told him about the existence of a will and that he
searched diligently for the original after the testator died.112 The propo-
nent had also testified that the will was probably stored in a lockbox to
which other people had access and someone had even improperly re-
moved a title to one of the testator’s cars.113 An employee of the testator
testified that she had previously seen an envelope labeled “Last Will and
Testament” in the lockbox.114 There was additional testimony about the
drafting of the will and the contents of the will.115
The court of appeals recognized that, when the original will is last seen
in the testator’s presence and cannot be found after death, there is a pre-
sumption that the testator destroyed the will with revocation intent.116 In
this case, however, the evidence discussed above was sufficient to rebut
the presumption by a preponderance of the evidence.117
The court of appeals next addressed whether the will was properly exe-
cuted.118 Because the will had a proper self-proving affidavit, there is a
presumption of proper execution even though the affidavit is merely a
photocopy.119 The testator signed the will with his middle and last names
rather than with his first, middle, and last names as was typed on the
will.120 The court of appeals explained that “there is no requirement that
[a testator’s] signature match exactly the type-written version of his
name.”121 Other arguments about the validity of the signature (handwrit-
ten or stamped, different thickness of ink between the testator and the
witnesses, etc.) were likewise rejected.122
The court of appeals also addressed the argument that the person who
wrote the will for the testator was not an attorney, and thus by engaging
in the unauthorized practice of law, her testimony lacked credibility
about what happened during the will execution ceremony.123 The court of
appeals stated “there was no authority to support this proposition.”124
To avoid problems such as those in this case, a testator needs to store
the original will with great care and seek the assistance of an attorney
110. Id. at *1–2.




115. Id. at *2.
116. Id. at *3.
117. Id. at *4.
118. Id. at *4–5.
119. Id. at *4, *6–7.
120. Id. at *4–5.
121. Id. at *5.
122. Id.
123. Id. at *6.
124. Id.
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with estate planning experience to draft the will, rather than a book-
keeper who then would be practicing law without a license.
O. ATTORNEYS’ FEES
In Jones v. Coyle,125 the independent executrix demanded that a bene-
ficiary return property belonging to the testatrix so that this property
could be properly administered.126 The beneficiary refused and the pro-
bate court allowed the beneficiary to retain the estate property.127 After
obtaining a writ of mandamus to force the turnover, the executrix asked
the probate court to award her attorneys’ fees against the beneficiary
under Probate Code § 242 (recodified as Estates Code § 352.051).128 The
probate court refused and the executrix appealed.129
The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the probate court
lacked the discretion to hold the beneficiary responsible for the attor-
neys’ fees.130 Instead, the estate is responsible for the fees.131 The court of
appeals explained that Texas follows the “American Rule” that does not
allow fee awards unless expressly authorized by a statute or a contract.132
The court of appeals closely examined the statute and found no basis for
shifting the fees from the estate to the losing party.133 Although the stat-
ute is written in the passive voice and does not state from whom the court
should order the payment of fees, the court of appeals noted that fees are
awarded regardless of whether the personal representative wins or loses
the case.134 Thus, it is implied that the estate is responsible, not another
party.135
The court of appeals, however, did provide future litigants with sage
advice by recommending that they seek attorneys’ fees under other stat-
utes that authorize them, such as the Texas Theft Liability Act.136 In a
trust case, however, Property Code § 114.064 allows the court to make an
award of costs and attorneys’ fees against any party as long as the award
is “equitable and just.”137
P. ESTATES OF ATTORNEYS
The 2015 Texas Legislature added new provisions to address what hap-
pens to trust and escrow accounts when a lawyer dies.138 The personal
125. 451 S.W.3d 486 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.).
126. Id. at 487.
127. Id.
128. Id.; see TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 352.051(2) (West 2016).
129. Jones, 451 S.W.3d at 487.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 489.
132. Id. at 488.
133. Id. at 488–89.
134. Id. at 489.
135. Id.
136. Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 134.005(b) (West 2011)).
137. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 114.064 (West 2014).
138. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 456.001 (West 2016).
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representative now has the authority to enter into a written contract with
a Texas lawyer who may then be a signer on the account, determine the
proper recipients of the funds in the account, distribute the funds to the
proper recipients, and then close the account.139 If the personal represen-
tative is a Texas attorney, the person may take these steps him or her-
self.140 The financial institution has a duty to comply with the attorney’s
instructions and is not liable for the actions of the attorney.141
V. TRUSTS
A. STANDING
In In re XTO Energy, Inc.,142 the trustee failed to pursue litigation on
behalf of the trust under the terms of the trust, which granted the trustee
the discretion to carry out the trustee’s powers and perform the trustee’s
duties.143 A beneficiary, unhappy with the trustee’s inaction, brought ac-
tion against the defendant on behalf of the trust. The trustee and the
defendant sought a writ of mandamus to force the trial court to dismiss
the beneficiary’s suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.144
The Dallas Court of Appeals began its analysis by recognizing that a
trust beneficiary may sue a third party on behalf of the trust if the trustee
cannot, or will not, bring the action.145 A beneficiary, however, cannot
bring an action merely because the trustee has refused to do so because
“[t]o allow such an action would render the trustee’s authority to manage
litigation on behalf of the trust illusory.”146
The court of appeals concluded that a beneficiary may not bring the
suit unless “the beneficiary pleads and proves that the trustee’s refusal to
pursue litigation constitutes fraud, misconduct, or a clear abuse of discre-
tion.”147 The court of appeals then engaged in a detailed analysis of the
underlying dispute and determined that there were no facts that would
support a finding that the trustee’s decision not to bring suit was “the
result of fraud, misconduct, or a clear abuse of discretion.”148 Accord-
ingly, the court of appeals conditionally granted mandamus relief.149 The
court of appeals, however, allowed the beneficiary’s claims against the
trustee for breach of duty to continue.150
This case appears to be the first time a Texas court has ruled on “the




142. 471 S.W.3d 126 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, no pet.).
143. Id. at 127
144. Id. at 130.
145. Id. at 131.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 132.
148. Id. at 135–36.
149. Id. at 137.
150. Id. at 138.
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that the trustee considered and concluded was not in the best interests of
the trust to pursue.”151 The court of appeals announced that the action
may proceed if the trustee’s failure to bring the action is “the result of
fraud, misconduct, or a clear abuse of discretion.”152
B. JURISDICTION
Warren v. Weiner153 teaches that a family court does not acquire exclu-
sive jurisdiction over a trust even though trust matters may be covered in
the divorce decree.154 A mother and father created a trust for a child and
named themselves as co-trustees. The mother and father divorced, but
the divorce decree provided for them to continue serving as trustees.155
After accusing each other of violating the terms of the trust, the mother
brought an action in probate court to terminate the trust or remove the
father as a co-trustee.156 In response, the father claimed that the probate
court lacked jurisdiction because the family court has continuing, exclu-
sive jurisdiction.157 The probate court agreed and the mother
appealed.158
The First Houston Court of Appeals reversed.159 The court of appeals
determined that the Family Code did not give the family court exclusive
jurisdiction over the trust.160 Instead, the family court has exclusive juris-
diction only over matters implicating the Family Code.161 The divorce de-
cree cannot grant or waive a court’s jurisdiction by agreement.162
The court of appeals also determined that the family court did not have
dominant jurisdiction.163 The claims of breach of trust were not con-
nected with the divorce proceedings in family court.164 Neither the child
nor the trust were parties to the divorce.165 There was no dispute relating
to the trust at the time of the divorce.166
Dowell v. Quiroz167 serves as an important reminder that a party bring-
ing survival or wrongful death claims must ascertain the correct court in
which to bring the actions.168 The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held
that a statutory county court at law with probate jurisdiction does not
151. Id. at 131.
152. Id. at 132.
153. 462 S.W.3d 140 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. denied).
154. Id. at 144.
155. Id. at 142.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 143.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 146.
160. Id. at 143–44.
161. Id. at 144 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 155.001(a) (West 2014)).
162. Id.




167. 462 S.W.3d 578 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.).
168. Id. at 586.
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have subject matter jurisdiction to hear survival and wrongful death
claims that are incident to an estate under Probate Code § 5A, because
the statutory provision existed on the date the claims were filed.169 This




The 2015 Texas Legislature added § 114.0031 to the Trust Code to pro-
vide more detailed coverage of trust protectors in the private trust
context.171
The key features of this new provision are:
• The settlor may grant the protector any powers and authority
which the settlor desires including, but not limited to, the power
to remove and appoint trustees and advisors, the power to modify
or amend the trust for tax purposes or to facilitate efficient trust
administration, and the power to modify, expand, or restrict the
terms of a power of appointment that the settlor granted to a
beneficiary.172
• By default, the trust protector is a fiduciary. The settlor, however,
may provide that a protector acts in a nonfiduciary capacity.173
• The trustee is liable for following the directions of a trust protec-
tor only if the trustee’s conduct constitutes willful misconduct.174
• If the settlor requires the trustee to obtain the consent of a trust
protector before acting, the trustee is not liable for any act taken
or not taken as a result of the protector’s failure to provide the
required consent after being requested to do so, unless the trus-
tee’s actions constitute willful misconduct or gross negligence.175
• Unless the settlor provided otherwise, the trustee has no duty to
monitor the protector’s conduct, to provide advice to or consult
with the protector, or tell the beneficiaries that that the trustee
would have acted differently from how the protector directed.176
• The trustee’s actions in carrying out the protector’s directions are
deemed to be merely administrative actions and are not consid-
ered to be the trustee monitoring or participating in actions
within the scope of the protector’s authority, unless there is clear
and convincing evidence to the contrary.177
169. Id. at 584–85.
170. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 31.002(6) (West 2016).
171. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 114.0031 (West 2016).
172. Id. § 114.0031(d).
173. Id. § 114.0031(e).
174. Id. § 114.0031(f).
175. Id. § 114.0031(g).
176. Id. § 114.0031(h).
177. Id. § 114.0031(i).
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2. Charitable Trusts
Trust Code § 114.003, which previously covered protectors for all types
of trusts, is now applicable only to charitable trusts imposing more re-
strictive rules than the new § 114.0031 provides for private trusts.178
D. PERPETUAL CARE CEMETERY TRUSTS
A perpetual care cemetery trust may now be modified or terminated
using the court’s deviation powers under Property Code § 112.054.179 In
addition to the grounds in this section, the court may modify the trust “if
the income from the fund is inadequate to maintain, repair, and care for
the perpetual care cemetery and another source for providing additional
contributions to the fund is unavailable.”180 The Banking Commissioner
of Texas must consent to any changes before the court may order the
changes.181
VI. OTHER ESTATE PLANNING MATTERS
A. TRANSFER ON DEATH DEEDS
The 2015 Texas Legislature enacted a “Texasized” version of the Uni-
form Real Property Transfer on Death Act, joining over a dozen other
states that have already done so.182 This Act permits a property owner to
designate the new owner of real property upon his or her death in a deed
that is properly recorded during the owner’s lifetime.183 Below are some
of the key features of this Act:
• The property owner must have contractual capacity (not merely tes-
tamentary capacity) to execute a Transfer on Death (TOD) deed.184
• An agent under a power of attorney may not execute a TOD deed
on behalf of the property owner.185
• The beneficiary does not need to know about the TOD deed and
does not need to have supplied any consideration.186 The benefici-
ary, however, may disclaim the property following the normal dis-
claimer procedures.187
• The named beneficiary has no legal or equitable interest in the
property until the beneficiary survives the property owner by 120
hours.188
178. Id. § 114.003.
179. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 712.0255 (West Supp. 2015).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 114 (2016).
183. Id. §§ 114.051, 114.055.
184. Id. § 114.054.
185. Id.
186. Id. § 114.056.
187. Id. § 114.105.
188. Id. § 114.103.
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• The property owner may revoke the TOD deed at any time and
does need a reason for so doing.189
• The property owner may not make the TOD deed irrevocable.190
• The property owner’s will cannot revoke or supersede a TOD
deed.191
• If the property owner names his or her spouse as the beneficiary
and then a court issues a final judgment of divorce, the TOD deed is
revoked as long as notice of the judgment is recorded before the
property owner’s death.192
• The TOD deed has no legal effect during the property owner’s life-
time.193 For example, the property owner may transfer the property
to someone other than the beneficiary, even if the transferee has
actual knowledge of the TOD deed, as long as the transferee
records his or her deed before the property owner dies.
• When the property owner dies, creditors with interests in the prop-
erty are generally treated like other estate creditors.194
• When the property owner dies, the property transferred by a TOD
deed is subject, as a last resort, to the claims against the estate, in-
cluding allowances in lieu of exempt property and the family
allowance.195
• The Act provides optional forms a property owner may use to cre-
ate and revoke TOD deeds.196
B. DISCLAIMERS
The Texas version of the Uniform Disclaimer of Property Interests Act
replaces the disclaimer provisions in both the Estates Code and the Trust
Code.197 Below are some of the significant changes:198
• The nine-month deadline to make a disclaimer was removed.199
There is no longer a time-based deadline for Texas disclaimers al-
though the nine-month rule still applies under federal law to dis-
claimers made for tax purposes.200
189. Id. § 114.052.
190. Id.
191. Id. § 114.057(b).
192. Id. § 114.057(c).
193. Id. § 114.101.
194. Id. § 114.104.
195. Id. § 114.106.
196. Id. §§ 114.151, 114.152.
197. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 240.001–.151 (West 2016).
198. See generally Glenn M. Karisch et al., Disclaimers Under the New Texas Uniform
Disclaimer of Property Interests Act, TEXAS PROBATE (Aug. 25, 2015), http://texaspro-
bate.com/download-cle-articles/Disclaim-
ers%20Under%20the%20New%20Texas%20UPPIA.pdf [https://perma.cc/2UJ2-UNBZ]
(addressing a comprehensive discussion of the Uniform Act).
199. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 240.151 (lacking to mention a deadline requirement that
would bar a disclaimer); see Karisch et al., supra note 198, at 10.
200. See Karsich et al., supra note 198, at 29.
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• The mechanics of making a disclaimer were simplified.201 For exam-
ple, an heir or beneficiary disclaiming an interest no longer needs to
file the disclaimer with the court; merely delivering it to the per-
sonal representative is normally sufficient.202
• Separate provisions govern the disclaimer of different types of
property and ownership methods.203
• Disclaimers by fiduciaries are expressly covered under rules for dif-
ferent types of fiduciaries,204 clarifying many areas where uncer-
tainty existed under prior law.
C. MALPRACTICE
According to Messner v. Boon,205 a successor personal representative
lacks standing to sue an attorney for malpractice who provided advice to
a previous personal representative.206 The administratrix filed suit against
an attorney alleging malpractice for improper representation of (1) the
decedent while the decedent was alive; and (2) the executrix after the
decedent died.207 The trial court granted a take-nothing judgment against
the administratrix and she appealed.208 The Texarkana Court of Appeals
held that the administratrix had standing to pursue claims for malprac-
tice, which the decedent had while alive, but lacked standing with regard
to the attorney’s representation of the executrix.209
With regard to the claim that the attorney was negligent in the repre-
sentation of the decedent, the court of appeals followed the clear line of
authority of Texas Supreme Court cases holding that although the attor-
ney owed no duties to non-client beneficiaries, the attorney owed duties
to the decedent and it is those duties, which the administratrix claims
were breached.210 In other words, the administratrix merely brought the
action the decedent could have brought had he not died.
But with regard to the attorney’s duties to the executrix, those duties
are owed only to the executrix.211 Thus, a successor personal representa-
tive such as the administratrix lacks standing to bring those claims.212 The
court of appeals rejected the administratrix’s claim that she stepped into
the executrix’s shoes when she took office and thus could bring whatever
claims the executrix could have brought if she had remained in office.213
201. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 240.101.
202. See Karisch et al., supra note 198, at 13–14.
203. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 240.102–.105 (West 2016); see Karisch et al., supra note
198, at 11, 15–16.
204. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 240.109.
205. 466 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015), judgm’t vacated w.r.m., 2016 Tex.
LEXIS 106 (Tex. Jan. 29, 2016).
206. Id. at 195.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 206.
210. Id. at 205–06.
211. Id. at 206.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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The court of appeals explained that the decedent could not have brought
suit against the attorney for this alleged malpractice and thus neither can
the administratrix.214 Of course, the executrix or her estate has standing
to bring a malpractice claim against the attorney.215
D. MULTIPLE-PARTY ACCOUNTS
1. Disclosures
The disclosure requirements with which a financial institution must
comply were tightened.216 A financial institution would be wise to use the
suggested form and have the customer initial to the right (not to the left,
below, or above) of each paragraph to avoid the necessity of complying
with additional requirements.217 The statutory form provided does not
have lines to initial on the right and thus they need to be added.218 The
statute provides that “each paragraph of the form” needs the customer’s
initials. It is possible that this requires the customer to initial not only the
type of account the customer selected, but all the other account-type
paragraphs as well as the textual paragraphs. A new section provides sim-
ilar rules for credit unions, which are more like those that previously ex-
isted for other financial institutions.219
2. P.O.D. Accounts
A guardian of the estate or an agent of an original payee may open a
Paid on Death (P.O.D.) account for the ward or principal.220
3. Trust Accounts
The provisions governing trust accounts were clarified to remove previ-
ous doubts as to the ability to name an express written trust as the benefi-
ciary of a trust account.221
4. Effect of Divorce
Under most circumstances, provisions of a P.O.D. or trust account in
favor of an ex-spouse or a relative of the ex-spouse who is not a relative
of the decedent will not be effective to transfer the funds to the ex-spouse
or the ex-spouse’s relative.222
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 113.053 (West 2016).
217. Id.
218. Id. § 113.052.
219. Id. § 113.0531.
220. Id. § 113.152(c).
221. Id. § 113.001.
222. Id. § 123.151(b).
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5. Access When Depositor Died Intestate
If an intestate dies owning a bank account that has funds which do not
pass to another person under the terms of the account, an interested per-
son may apply to the court for an order requiring the financial institution
to reveal the balance in the account.223 This request may be done if 90
days have passed since the intestate died, no letters have been issued, and
no petition for the appointment of a personal representative is pend-
ing.224 This new procedure will help heirs determine the appropriate ad-
ministration method for the decedent’s estate.
6. Standing of Personal Representative
Bank of America, N.A. v. Eisenhauer225 teaches that the personal rep-
resentative of a decedent who opened a multiple-party account, which
would transfer the money outside of probate, lacks the ability to recover
for breach of that contract because none of the funds would be in the
decedent’s estate whether or not the contract was breached.226 A hus-
band and his wife opened a joint account with survivorship rights that
also named two pay on death beneficiaries upon the death of the last joint
owner. After the husband died, one of the beneficiaries closed the ac-
count even though the wife was still alive. The bank issued equal checks
to both beneficiaries.227 The other beneficiary realized that this was in-
correct, so he used the power of attorney he had for the wife and depos-
ited the funds into a new account in the wife’s name and named himself
as the pay on death beneficiary.228 The beneficiary who closed the ac-
count kept the funds she improperly received from the account.229
After the wife died, the other beneficiary became the wife’s executor
and sued the bank for the money it improperly distributed to the benefi-
ciary who closed the account.230 The jury found that the bank failed to
comply with the deposit agreement, but that the estate suffered no dam-
ages.231 The trial court granted the executor’s request for a judgment not-
withstanding the verdict and the court of appeals affirmed.232
The Texas Supreme Court reversed without even hearing oral argu-
ments.233 The supreme court explained that neither the wife nor her es-
tate lost anything when the beneficiary who improperly closed the
account received half of the account funds.234 The account was a non-
probate asset and the estate would not have held any funds, even if the
223. Id. § 153.003.
224. Id.
225. 474 S.W.3d 264 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam).








234. Id. at 266.
540 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 2
account had remained open until the wife’s death.235
E. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH INHERITANCE RIGHTS
In Jackson Walker v. Kinsel,236 a jury found that the defendants were
liable for tortiously interfering with the Kinsels’ inheritance rights.237 The
trial court then awarded damages as well as other remedies in an attempt
to undo the interference.238 The defendants appealed not on the ground
that their conduct was not tortious, but rather that the tort is not recog-
nized as a cause of action.239
The Amarillo Court of Appeals agreed and reversed.240 The court of
appeals based its holding on the fact that neither the Texas Supreme
Court nor the Fort Worth Court of Appeals has expressly recognized the
tort.241
The strong dissent points out that six of the Texas intermediate appel-
late courts have previously recognized the tort, including the Amarillo
Court of Appeals.242 Additionally, six other courts, including the Fort
Worth Court of Appeals, discussed the tort assuming it was a valid cause
of action.243
Surprisingly, neither opinion cited to Estates Code § 54.001 (formerly
Probate Code § 10C), which, in this author’s opinion, impliedly provides
legislative recognition of the tort.244 In relevant part, this section states,
“[t]he filing or contesting in probate court of a pleading relating to a de-
cedent’s estate does not constitute tortious interference with inheritance
of the estate.”245 Why would the Texas legislature say something cannot
be tortious interference if Texas does not recognize the tort in the first
place?
F. DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY
1. Filing Requirement
If a durable power of attorney is used in a real property transaction
that needs to be recorded, the power of attorney must be filed not later
than the thirtieth day after the real property instrument is filed.246 The
235. Id. at 265–66.
236. No. 07-13-00130-CV, 2015 WL 2085220 (Tex. App.—Amarillo, Apr. 10, 2015, pet.
filed) (mem. op).
237. Id. at *3.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at *19.
241. Id. at *3 (The Texas Supreme Court transferred the case from the Fort Worth
Court of Appeals to the Amarillo Court of Appeals as part of its docket equalization
efforts).
242. Id. at *20 (Pirtle, P.A., dissenting).
243. Id. at *21.
244. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 54.001 (West 2016).
245. Id.
246. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 751.151.
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amendment does not provide the consequences of a late filing.247 For ex-
ample, is the underlying real property transaction void or voidable?
2. When Fiduciary Duties Are Owed
In Jordan v. Lyles,248 an agent was accused of breach of fiduciary duty
by placing a significant portion of the principal’s property into accounts
naming her as a pay on death beneficiary or giving her survivorship
rights.249 The Tyler Court of Appeals first addressed whether the princi-
pal’s heirs had standing to bring a suit for breach of fiduciary duty.250 The
court of appeals explained that normally an heir lacks standing because
the principal’s personal representative usually has the exclusive right to
bring the suit.251 However, because the principal’s estate was handled
with a muniment of title, there was no executor appointed and thus the
heirs had standing.252
The jury awarded the heirs damages for breach of fiduciary duty and
tortious interference with inheritance rights.253 The court of appeals,
however, granted the agent’s motion for a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict.254 The agent argued that the court was correct because the trans-
actions were fair to the principal.255 But the agent was unable to prove
that she specifically discussed the transactions with the principal and in-
formed him of the material facts relating to them.256 The agent unsuccess-
fully claimed she was merely a scrivener when she completed various
actions for the principal rather than acting in a fiduciary capacity.257 Ac-
cordingly, the court of appeals reversed and reinstated the jury verdict.258
Accordingly, an agent owes fiduciary duties to the principal at all times,
even when the agent technically is not acting under the authority granted
by the power of attorney. Thus, an agent should act with the utmost de-
gree of loyalty to the principal and avoid being involved in any transac-
tion that could potentially benefit the agent.
3. Breach of Duty
In Miller v. Lucas,259 the agent transferred the principal’s property to
himself using the authority granted under a durable power of attorney.260
After the principal died, the distributees of the principal’s estate entered
247. Id.
248. 455 S.W.3d 785 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2015, no pet.).
249. Id. at 789.
250. Id. at 790–91.
251. Id. at 790.
252. Id. at 791.
253. Id. at 790.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 794.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 796.
259. No. 02-13-00298-CV, 2015 WL 2437887 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 21, 2015, pet.
denied) (mem. op.).
260. Id. at *1.
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into a family settlement agreement and assigned to the plaintiff the right
to pursue an action against the agent. The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of the plaintiff and ordered that the property be con-
veyed to the plaintiff free of all encumbrances.261 The agent appealed.262
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s finding of
breach of fiduciary duty because the self-dealing was conclusively estab-
lished—the agent used the power of attorney to convey the principal’s
property to himself by deed.263 The court of appeals, however, deter-
mined that the trial court’s remedy was excessive because it exceeded the
relief the plaintiff sought.264 The trial court erroneously ordered the
property conveyed free of all encumbrances, not just those that arose af-
ter the agent sold the property to himself.265
G. TRANSFERS TO MINORS
The amount that may be transferred to a custodian for the benefit of a
minor under certain circumstances has been increased from $10,000 to
$25,000, to account for inflation.266
H. MISAPPLICATION BY FIDUCIARY
The values of property that a fiduciary must have misapplied to be
guilty of various offenses increased, to account for inflation.267 For exam-
ple, to be guilty of a first degree felony, the fiduciary now must misapply
more than $300,000, rather than $200,000.268
I. DIRECTIVE TO PHYSICIANS
The form for the Texas Directive to Physicians (Living Will) received
minor changes.269
J. BODY DISPOSITION
1. Persons With Authority to Control Disposition
The decedent’s personal representative has been added to the list of
individuals who have the authority to control the disposition of remains if
the decedent did not leave written instructions or name an agent. The
priority of the personal representative is after the decedent’s adult sib-
lings, but before more distant relatives.270 Liability for the costs rests
solely on the decedent’s estate and not the personal representative
261. Id. at *2.
262. Id.
263. Id. at *4.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 141.007(c) (West 2016).
267. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.45(c) (West 2016).
268. Id. § 32.45(c)(7).
269. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.033 (West Supp. 2015).
270. See id. § 711.002.
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individually.271
2. Effect of Divorce
If the decedent divorces an agent after signing the document, the ex-
spouse may not make disposition arrangements unless the instrument ex-
pressly states that the ex-spouse is to serve as agent regardless of the
divorce.272
3. Clarification of When Agent Signs
Previously, there was some confusion as to whether the agent must sign
the document at the time of execution or only after the decedent dies.
The statute now provides that the agent does not need to sign until the
agent acts pursuant to the appointment.273
4. Non-Compliance Damages
If the provider of a prepaid funeral contract or other contract providing
for funeral arrangements fails to comply with the contract, the provider
“is liable for the additional expenses incurred in the disposition of the
decedent’s remains as a result of the breach of contract.”274
5. Form
The form, which is now optional rather than mandatory, has been
changed in several ways including:275
• The form is now called “Appointment for Disposition of
Remains.”276
• The spaces for the agent’s acceptance of the appointment were
moved from the body of the form to the end of the form.277
• The form now includes an explanation providing that the appoint-
ment of a spouse is revoked upon divorce unless the instrument
states otherwise.278
K. SELF-HELP FORMS
The 2015 Texas Legislature charged the Texas Supreme Court with the
task of promulgating a wide range of self-help forms in English and Span-
ish. The forms are also to include plain language instructions for wills in
six common scenarios (e.g., single with no children and married with an
adult child), an application for probating a will as a muniment of title, and
271. See id. § 711.002(a-3).
272. See id. § 711.002(c).
273. Id.
274. Id. § 711.002(g).
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a small estate affidavit.279 Each form must also state that it is not a substi-
tute for attorney advice.280 The clerks of the probate courts will have the
duty to tell the general public about the forms, and the court must accept
these forms unless they are completed so poorly that it causes a substan-
tial defect that cannot be fixed.281 Note that the Spanish versions are for
convenience only and cannot be submitted to the probate court.282
VII. CONCLUSION
The new cases and legislation address a wide array of issues, some with
very narrow effects and others with potentially broad impacts. This article
has discussed the practical application of the cases and statutes. It is also
important to understand some overarching principles that transcend indi-
vidual cases and statutes to form a pattern. Here are some examples of
patterns this author detected:
• Litigants must be certain to file in the court that has proper jurisdic-
tion, otherwise their claims will be dismissed.283
• Courts want to ensure that claims can be brought if the claimant is
not trying to contest the will itself, but instead is trying to bring a
good faith claim, which does not fall within the scope of a no con-
test clause.284
• The legislature wants to ensure that the effect of divorce is clear.285
It impacts pour over trusts, P.O.D accounts, and body disposition,
among other things.
• The legislature is trying to make the estate planning and probate
process easier and more accessible by admitting foreign wills that
have already been probated in other states and providing self-help
forms.286
279. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.020 (West Supp. 2015).
280. Id. § 22.020(e).
281. Id. § 22.020(g).
282. Id. § 22.020(d).
283. See Dowell v. Quiroz, 462 S.W.3d 578, 586 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2015, no
pet.) (mem. op.); Warren v. Weiner, 462 S.W.3d 140, 144 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2015, pet. denied).
284. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 254.005(b) (West 2016); Ard v. Hudson, No. 02-13-
00198-CV, 2015 WL 4967045, at *8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 20, 2015, pet. filed)
(mem. op.); Estate of Cole, No. 02-13-00417-CV, 2015 WL 392230, at *9 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth Jan. 29, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.).
285. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 123.001(b); id. § 123.151; TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE ANN. § 711.002(c) (West Supp. 2015).
286. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 256.152(b)–(c); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.020.
